An Introduction to Game Theory

Description

An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences. Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences. Coverage includes the fundamental concepts of strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, and coalitional games; the more advanced subjects of Bayesian games and extensive games with imperfect information; and the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory, evolutionary equilibrium, rationalizability, and maxminimization. The book offers a wide variety of illustrations from the social and behavioral sciences and more than 280 exercises. Each topic features examples that highlight theoretical points and illustrations that demonstrate how the theory may be used. Explaining the key concepts of game theory as simply as possible while maintaining complete precision, An Introduction to Game Theory is ideal for undergraduate and introductory graduate courses in game theory.

Table of contents

Chapter 1. Introduction
I. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
Chapter 2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory
Chapter 3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations
Chapter 4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Chapter 5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
Chapter 6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations
Chapter 7. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion
Chapter 8. Coalitional Games and the Core
Chapter 9. Games with Imperfect Information
Chapter 10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
II. VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS
Chapter 11. Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization
Chapter 12. Rationalizability
Chapter 13. Evolutionary Equilibrium
Chapter 14. Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma
Chapter 15. Repeated Games: General Results
Chapter 16. Bargaining
Chapter 17. Appendix: Mathematics