Balanced Constitutionalism
Courts and Legislatures in India and the United Kingdom
Price: 995.00 INR
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ISBN:
9780199470587
Publication date:
26/12/2016
Hardback
352 pages
Price: 995.00 INR
We sell our titles through other companies
Disclaimer :You will be redirected to a third party website.The sole responsibility of supplies, condition of the product, availability of stock, date of delivery, mode of payment will be as promised by the said third party only. Prices and specifications may vary from the OUP India site.
ISBN:
9780199470587
Publication date:
26/12/2016
Hardback
352 pages
Chintan Chandrachud
This book examines the promise of the new model of judicial review against its performance in practice by comparing judicial review under the Human Rights Act (HRA) of the UK to an exemplar of the old model of judicial review, the Indian Constitution. It argues that although the HRA fosters a more balanced allocation of powers between legislatures and courts than the Indian Constitution, it does so for a novel reason. Balanced constitutionalism is not achieved through the legislative rejection of judicial decision-making about rights. Instead, the nature of the remedy under the HRA enables British courts to assert their genuine interpretations of rights in situations in which Indian courts find it difficult to do so.
Rights: World Rights
Chintan Chandrachud
Description
The Human Rights Act (HRA) of the UK, enacted in 1998, provoked particular interest amongst scholars. Unlike systems of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, it promised a new, ‘balanced’ model for the protection of rights, which conferred courts with a limited power of review over legislation. Under this new model, rights-based decision-making was expected to be balanced amongst courts and legislatures, rather than lopsided in favour of either. Indian courts, on the other hand, have always been constitutionally entrusted with the power to strike down primary legislation enacted by the Union and state legislatures.
This book examines the promise of the new model against its performance in practice by comparing judicial review under the HRA to an exemplar of the old model of judicial review, the Indian Constitution. It argues that although the HRA fosters a more balanced allocation of powers between legislatures and courts than the Indian Constitution, it does so for a novel reason. Balanced constitutionalism is not achieved through the legislative rejection of judicial decision-making about rights. Instead, the nature of the remedy under the HRA enables British courts to assert their genuine interpretations of rights in situations in which Indian courts find it difficult to do so.
About the Author
Chintan Chandrachud is an associate at the London office of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP. He holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge, UK.
Chintan Chandrachud
Table of contents
List of Tables and Figures
Table of Legislation
Table of Cases
Acknowledgement
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Introduction
1. Balancing Decision-making amongst Courts and Legislatures
2. Judicial Review and Political Responses
3. Comparing Political Responses in India and the United Kingdom
4. Judicial Review in the Shadow of Remedies
5. Collateral Institutions to Judicial Review
Conclusion
Appendix A: Political Responses to Judgments Striking Down Legislation in India
Appendix B: Political Responses to Declarations of Incompatibility in the United Kingdom
Index
About the Author
Chintan Chandrachud
Features
- Compare judicial review under the Indian Constitution and the UK Human Rights Act
- Thoroughly analyses case law and political practice in India and the UK
- Offers a novel explanation for the superiority of the new model of constitutionalism over traditional models of judicial supremacy
Chintan Chandrachud
Review
‘By showing how complex the institution of constitutional review is in real-world practice, Chandrachud makes an important contribution to constitutional theory.’—Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School, USA
‘This monograph is a profound work of comparative public law.’—Christopher Forsyth, University of Cambridge, UK
‘[I]t deconstructs the political dynamics of these two powerful institutions [British and Indian courts] and the comparative effects of two different models on these dynamics.’—Harish Salve, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India
Description
The Human Rights Act (HRA) of the UK, enacted in 1998, provoked particular interest amongst scholars. Unlike systems of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, it promised a new, ‘balanced’ model for the protection of rights, which conferred courts with a limited power of review over legislation. Under this new model, rights-based decision-making was expected to be balanced amongst courts and legislatures, rather than lopsided in favour of either. Indian courts, on the other hand, have always been constitutionally entrusted with the power to strike down primary legislation enacted by the Union and state legislatures.
This book examines the promise of the new model against its performance in practice by comparing judicial review under the HRA to an exemplar of the old model of judicial review, the Indian Constitution. It argues that although the HRA fosters a more balanced allocation of powers between legislatures and courts than the Indian Constitution, it does so for a novel reason. Balanced constitutionalism is not achieved through the legislative rejection of judicial decision-making about rights. Instead, the nature of the remedy under the HRA enables British courts to assert their genuine interpretations of rights in situations in which Indian courts find it difficult to do so.
About the Author
Chintan Chandrachud is an associate at the London office of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP. He holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge, UK.
Reviews
‘By showing how complex the institution of constitutional review is in real-world practice, Chandrachud makes an important contribution to constitutional theory.’—Mark Tushnet, Harvard Law School, USA
‘This monograph is a profound work of comparative public law.’—Christopher Forsyth, University of Cambridge, UK
‘[I]t deconstructs the political dynamics of these two powerful institutions [British and Indian courts] and the comparative effects of two different models on these dynamics.’—Harish Salve, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India
Table of contents
List of Tables and Figures
Table of Legislation
Table of Cases
Acknowledgement
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Introduction
1. Balancing Decision-making amongst Courts and Legislatures
2. Judicial Review and Political Responses
3. Comparing Political Responses in India and the United Kingdom
4. Judicial Review in the Shadow of Remedies
5. Collateral Institutions to Judicial Review
Conclusion
Appendix A: Political Responses to Judgments Striking Down Legislation in India
Appendix B: Political Responses to Declarations of Incompatibility in the United Kingdom
Index
About the Author
